SECURITY-INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

PUBLIC REPORT

2016

www.soa.hr

OUR MISSION

We detect, investigate and understand security threats and challenges by collecting and analyzing information significant for national security, thus providing the state leadership and other state bodies with reliable intelligence support in decision-making and acting to protect Croatia's national security, interests and the well-being of its citizens.

OUR VISION

A modern, efficient and responsible security-intelligence agency, suitable to requirements, focused on the accomplishment of its mission and achievement of top results, with a significant national influence and impact and a regional reach, recognized by its developed capabilities, excellent employees and strong partner ties.

OUR VALUES

EXCELLENCE

- Striving to accomplish the highest standards in everything we do
- Focusing on finding solutions and achieving results
- Dedication to constant improvement and learning through execution of tasks
- Encouraging creativity and innovation
- Demonstrating leadership and professionalism through personal example
- Using modern techniques and tools in our work

INTEGRITY

- Responsibility, discretion, reliability, and commitment to the execution of tasks
- Patriotism and pride through responsible work
- Optimism, morality, and courage in difficult situations
- Loyalty to the Agency, its mission and values
- Respecting the norms of the security culture
- We evaluate ourselves according to the values and results we bring to the service on a daily basis

ACCOUNTABILITY

- We operate strictly within our legislative framework and with respect for ethical and professional standards
- We are accountable for our work to the competent authorities
- Parliamentary, expert, and civilian oversight additionally ensure the lawful conduct of the Agency

TEAMWORK

- Achieving success together, sharing risks, and helping each other
- We value our colleagues and respect our differences
- We foster honest and open communication
- We are provided with equal opportunity possibilities dependent upon our qualities, skills, and knowledge
- We are committed to building strong and reliable relations with other state bodies, institutions, and international partners

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

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Dear Readers,

It is with a distinct pleasure that I present the third edition of the public report on the work of the Security-Intelligence Agency (SOA) with an overview of the security situation in the Republic of Croatia and its surroundings.

In the past three years, SOA's public reports have become the axis of public consideration of the security challenges and threats that Croatia is facing.

A well-coordinated work of state bodies supported by the citizens of Croatia is the safeguard of the national security. To achieve synergy between the state bodies and citizens, it is necessary that the public has access to well-founded and objective information on the threats, risks and challenges that we are faced with. We in SOA consider our duty to make this information available to the citizens whose support is necessary to our work.

With each day, global security issues are becoming more complex while challenges and threats grow in numbers, just like factors and global scene "players". There is an ever-increasing number of actors that affect the security situation and the speed in which changes occur is sometimes surprising. All of this brings upon increasingly unpredictable development of events and the timeframe for decision-making is becoming narrower as we speak.

Timely and quick decisions cannot be made without access to reliable information and a deep understanding of security phenomena and trends, which is exactly why SOA plays an important role in the protection of Croatian national interests and security.

That is why we in SOA are constantly seeking out opportunities to upgrade our operative and analytical work. We are perfecting our information collection capabilities, especially through work with sources as well as using technical equipment to gather data from cyber space. Our analyses have become more user-focused, better to serve as a basis to making informed decisions.

International cooperation is another extremely important aspect of our work. That's why we continue to build partnership and mutual trust with selected security-intelligence services that share not only our common democratic values but risks as well. SOA is an active participant in the EU and NATO bodies and a number of international multilateral security-intelligence platforms.

For instance, EU member states' security services work closely with each other and their Norwegian and Swedish partners within the CTG or the Counter Terrorism Group through which an already intensive cooperation will achieve new, higher standards.

Facing modern security challenges requires modern technological capabilities as well. That is why we in SOA have multiplied our investments in developing modern technologies.

However, success of our mission mostly depends on our employees. Investing in the development of employees' competencies and specialist training remains our top priority.

Our recruitment procedure is based on internal ordinances to ensure that the Agency, according to its current needs, employs only those who have met its demanding, objective and highly professional selection criteria.

On this occasion we would like to again encourage young, educated, and motivated individuals who welcome challenge and wish to contribute to the general well-being of our country to apply for employment in SOA. We guarantee that we will conduct a demanding and competitive selection procedure with equal opportunity for all.

To successfully perform its tasks SOA sometimes has to invade, in accordance with the law, the privacy of certain individuals. Being aware of the sensitivity of this issue, we implement covert measures very responsibly and professionally and only after having met all legal conditions, our sole objectives being individuals who we justifiably suspect of wanting or working to jeopardize national security, Croatia's interests or the safety of its citizens. A well-developed multi-layered and varied oversight of our work guarantees that we conduct these sensitive tasks in accordance with the Constitution and law.

The Croatian public continues to display strong interest for our work. That is why our public reports are very well accepted by experts and the general public as well as our partners.

Last year we have completed yet another chapter of Croatian history by declassifying all archived materials left over from the ex-Yugoslavian services and presenting it to the Croatian State Archives.

SOA's daily tasks are immensely important and require a great deal of responsibility. That is why I take this opportunity to thank all of the Agency's employees who work to make our homeland a safer place to live. Their skills and knowledge, with the help of modern technical equipment, guarantee that SOA will successfully face all future challenges and threats and provide basis to the protection of national security, interests and citizens of the Republic of Croatia.

Director

Daniel Markić

Skills and knowledge of SOA's employees, along with the modern technical equipment, guarantee that SOA will remain capable of responding to contemporary security challenges and threats and provide basis for the protection of national security, interests and citizens of the Republic of Croatia.

ABOUT THE SECURITY–INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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The Security-Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia

The Croatian security-intelligence system is defined by the Act on the Security-Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia.

There are two security-intelligence agencies in the Republic of Croatia: the Security-Intelligence Agency (SOA) and the Military Security-Intelligence Agency (VSOA). Their task is to collect and analize information significant for national security; namely, information required for making decisions relevant for the protection of national interests.

The work of the security-intelligence agencies is guided by the President of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of Croatia through the **National Security Council (VNS)**. Along with the National Security Council there is also the **Council for the Coordination of Security-Intelligence Agencies** (Council) which provides the operational coordination of the work of the security-intelligence agencies. The expert and administrative tasks for the National Security Council and of the Council are performed by the **Office of the National Security Council (UVNS)**.

Organizational scheme of the security-intelligence system of the Republic of Croatia

The Role of SOA

SOA's work consists of special forms of collecting and analyzing information relevant to national security. In this way we provide intelligence support to the state leadership and competent state bodies to ensure timely and efficient decision-making.

SOA collects and analyses information with the aim of detecting and preventing activities directed against the existence, independence, integrity, and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia, or aimed at the violent overthrow of the constitutional state order, threatening of human rights, fundamental freedoms, or the foundations of the economic system.

SOA also collects and analyses political, economic, scientific-technological, and security-related information concerning foreign countries, organizations, political and economic alliances, groups and individuals, as well as other information relevant to national security.

The findings and assessments relevant to national security are reported by SOA to the legally authorized users of information (state leadership, ministries and other state bodies).

SOA is part of the national security system and its functioning has a substantial interministerial component. Therefore, SOA cooperates with and delivers information and assessments to competent state bodies, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the State Attorney's Office, the Office for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK), the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, and other bodies.

In fulfilling its tasks, SOA develops partnerships with security and intelligence agencies from other countries and participates in the work of international security and intelligence forums and organizations as well as in the work of relevant NATO and EU bodies.

Competencies

On the basis of the law, SOA was given special authority enabling it to collect security and intelligence information in a number of ways: by communication with citizens, requesting of official data, use of covert measures and procedures, use of public sources and exchange of information with partner security-intelligence services.

Citizens can provide SOA with valuable information on possible threats to national security. It is therefore important that citizens have confidence in our discretion and professional work.

Much data can be collected from so-called open sources (Internet, TV, the media...). The expansion of the Internet offers access to large quantities of publically available information.

SOA may gather information by using covert associates as well as measures of covert data collection through technical means (supervision of electronic communication, listening devices, etc.).

In the collection of information, the principle of gradualness is applied. This means that if SOA exhausts regular methods for processing a security threat, it will apply measures of covert information collection. At the same time, when choices exist among a number of measures of covert information collection, the measure that least violates constitutionally protected rights and freedoms shall be used.

The application of covert information collection measures that restrict the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual and citizens must be authorized by the Supreme Court or SOA Director, depending on the type of measure.

Channeling SOA's Activities

SOA channels its activities to those areas which have been identified in the strategic and management documents as relevant to national security and national interests. These documents include the National Security Strategy, National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Terrorism, and Annual Guidelines for the Work of Security-Intelligence Agencies.

These documents provide SOA with guidelines for its activities and the goals it has to achieve. It plans and performs its tasks on the basis of these documents. SOA then provides reports on information collected to its users.

Graphic chart of the intelligence cycle

SOA collects and analyses information in order to warn the state leadership of possible threats to national security and citizens of the Republic of Croatia.

SECURITY SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

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The security situation in Croatia has been considered stable in previous years, but the events we witnessed in recent months indicate that the security environment in Croatia's surroundings is becoming increasingly complex. Terrorist threat to Croatia has increased following a string of terrorist attacks in Europe (France, Belgium and BH) and especially after a Croatian national was kidnapped in Egypt and the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) called on its sympathizers to launch terrorist attacks in SE Europe.

Economic difficulties and high unemployment levels have prompted many Croatian citizens to emigrate in search of work. As a consequence, we are faced with the issue of aging population and even depopulation of certain areas of the country, which in the long run could affect Croatia's development perspectives.

The left and right-wing extremist scene in Croatia, due to its small membership and lack of organizational structure, has no significant potential to pose a threat to national security. War traumas and unresolved inter-ethnic issues may become fertile ground for extremism.

The fact that members of the younger population have been noticed to express sympathies toward Greater Serbia and Chetnik extremism especially gives rise to concern. However, the threat from this type of extremism is limited as the number of supporters is negligible and they have no organizational structure in Croatia.

Intelligence interests of other countries in regards to Croatia are directed at gathering information on internal security-political circumstances and mutual open issues, as well as information related to Croatia's NATO and EU membership. Along with gathering information, intelligence systems of other countries also seek to actively influence Croatia's internal processes.

Corruption remains a prominent social issue with long-term detrimental effects on the Croatian state. All forms of economic crime are known to be tightly linked with corruption.

Croatia is intersected by one of the branches of the so-called *Balkan smuggling route*. Regional criminal groups foster ties with those based in Croatia and use our territory to conduct their activities and recruit individuals from the Croatian criminal milieu. Money laundering attempts have also been detected.

In September 2015 we were faced with the unprecedented migrant wave that suddenly turned toward Croatia. By the end of that year, Croatia saw more than 600 000 refugees and migrants transit her territory. Even though no significant security incidents were registered at the time, it was later determined that terrorist organizations used the migrant wave to dispatch their members to Europe.

In a globalized world, the effects of each disturbance in energy supply are also felt in Croatia. However, thanks to having its own gas resources, Croatia is much more stable and less susceptible to such disturbances than many European states.

Through its membership in the EU and NATO, Croatia has enhanced its capability for maintaining a high level of security. Being part of the Euro-Atlantic political framework brings numerous economic, political and security advantages on both the internal and foreign political levels, but at the same time presents the Republic of Croatia with new challenges through its participation in political and security activities of the EU and NATO. In addition, EU membership also implies a number of challenges which have an influence on the daily activities of SOA, such as the easier crossing of state borders, increased number of security checks, intensified intelligence interest of third parties, and the need for intensification of international security-intelligence cooperation.

Terrorism

Although the level of terrorist threat of Islamist background has increased in Europe, it still remains low in Croatia.

The previous year has been marked by terrorist attacks in France and Belgium, from the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks on 7th Jan 2015 and Paris attacks on 13th November 2015, to the attacks in Brussels. All of them were directly linked with the spread of terrorism of Islamist background. In February 2015 two people were killed in Denmark in a shooting inspired by terrorist motives. Tunisia and Turkey have also suffered large-scale terrorist attacks.

In the summer of 2015 Croatia itself was affected by a terrorist act – a Croatian national, Tomislav Salopek, was kidnapped in Egypt.

In 2015 terrorist attacks occurred even in our closest neighbourhood - April attack at a police station in Zvornik in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the killing of two BH Armed Forces members in November. The long border we share with BH and the social, transport, economic and other ties are only some of the reasons why these attacks attracted so much attention in Croatia.

The number of individuals advocating the radical interpretation of Islam in Croatia is quite small, several dozen individuals, and most of them are not proponents of terrorist attack methods. Radicalization in Croatia has not reached wide proportions, due in part to the very good position, integration, and reputation of the Islamic community in Croatian society.

However, we remain concerned over the existence of radical Islamist enclaves in neighbouring countries and the fact that many jihadists originating from the region have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS.

Since 2012 around 900 persons from SE Europe have left to conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. They mostly originate from BH, Kosovo, Serbia/Sanjak, Macedonia and Albania. The majority of

them were men wanting to join the "Jihad", mainly in ISIS ranks, with few siding with AQ's *Al Nusrah Front.* Women and children were also among the persons who departed for ISIS-controlled territory. We have also detected the return of jihadists from war zones. Even though Croatia has not seen any returnees yet, their return to neighbouring countries has an impact on the security situation and an indirect influence on Croatia. Around 300 jihadists are known to have returned to Croatia's south-east neigbourhood.

Six persons with Croatian citizenship are currently located on ISIS-controlled territory, and one person has returned to his country of residence. Most of them have, in addition to Croatian, citizenships of other states. Their common trait is that they have left the Republic of Croatia before becoming radicalized or else have never lived in the Republic of Croatia. The radicalization process took place abroad after they left their place of residence for territory under the control of ISIS.

The phenomenon of radicalized women leaving for the area of the so-called Islamic State in the company of their jihadist spouse, or else starting a family there, has also been registered in the Republic of Croatia.

ISIS members in Syria who originate from SE Europe are also quite active in cyber space. They keep their own web pages within ISIS' media center *Al-Hayat*. Their video *Honor is in Jihad, A Message to the People of the Balkans* contained calls for terrorist attacks, killings and overthrowing the governments of SE European countries.

An image from the video released on 10 July 2015, featuring jihadists who call for terrorist attacks and killings in the Balkans

It is our estimate that for the time being, there is no direct threat to the security of the Republic of Croatia from the jihadists in Syria or returnees; however, a possible threat from the so-called "lone wolves" should not be excluded. These are individuals who are prepared to

carry out a terrorist attack independently, without the support of some terrorist organization, and are therefore very difficult to detect.

In addition, the medium and long-term threat remains that the returnees who are militarily trained, radicalized, and traumatized by their war experiences will serve, in contact with terrorist structures, as executioners or logistic support for actual terrorist attacks.

THE KIDNAPPING OF TOMISLAV SALOPEK

Tomislav Salopek was kidnapped in Egypt on 22 July 2015 at around 6.00 a.m. while en route from the workers' camp Bahariya to Cairo, when the vehicle of French company CGG in which Salopek and the driver were travelling was intercepted by four kidnappers dressed as Bedouins.

By the way the kidnapping was performed, the Egyptian authorities concluded that Salopek was kidnapped for ransom (this is quite common in Egypt) and directed their investigation accordingly.

On 30 July 2015 the wife of Tomislav Salopek and the CGG company received an e-mail message with Salopek's photo and a request for 30 mil $ ransom. CGG's attempts to establish contact with the kidnappers were unsuccessful, signaling this was not kidnapping for ransom, but a terrorist act.

These suspicions were finally corroborated on the 5th of August 2015, when, at the moment when international attention was turned to Egypt because of the opening of the Suez Canal extension, a video was released showing Salopek reading a message addressed at Egyptian authorities. The message announced Salopek would be executed unless the Egyptian authorities released female Muslim prisoners from jail. ISIS' Egyptian branch claimed responsibility for the kidnapping.

Immediately after learning about the kidnapping, SOA dispatched officers to Cairo and initiated various forms of international security-intelligence cooperation. Along with SOA, Egyptian security services and partner services present in that part of the world actively worked together on reconstructing the kidnapping, locating the kidnappers and gathering information about the case.

Despite all efforts, on 12th August 2015 a photo was released of a decapitated person claimed to be Salopek, with an attached message saying: "Hostage was executed because of Croatia's participation in the war against the Islamic State. After the expiry of the deadline, he was abandoned by both the Egyptian and Croatian government".

SOA continues to work on the case of Tomislav Salopek in order to determine the circumstances of the kidnapping, identify the perpetrators and reveal his fate.

The transit of foreign nationals, suspected of facilitating terrorist activities, over the Croatian territory is another challenge that we face. It became especially prominent in the context of the migration wave that passed through Croatia. Ever since the beginning of the migration crisis there have been indications that terrorist organizations might use it to dispatch terrorists to Europe. These suspicions were validated after it had been confirmed that some of the Paris attackers passed through Croatia as part of the migration wave.

Extremism

Due to the lack of membership and organization in both left and right-wing ideological groups in the Republic of Croatia, there is little potential for extremist groups or individuals to endanger its security status. Unemployment and dissatisfaction among the youth can cause indifference and disappointment in the legal system, which can then become a risk factor in the development of extremism.

Extremism was identified in individuals who are active within sport support groups. Violence as well as extremist rhetoric and symbolism have a long standing tradition among parts of some football supporters' groups. It is those parts that are responsible for jeopardizing Croatia's security status and tarnishing its international reputation. The biggest instigators of these phenomena are well-organized extremist fractions within the principal supporters' groups and violence they display outside of sporting events with ever-increasing regularity draws special attention.

In the area of right-wing extremism in Croatia, the activities of members of the Croatian branch of neo-Nazi and other similar organizations are ongoing. Followers of extreme right ideologies foster mutual ties and strive to establish contacts with sympathizers in EU member countries. Due to the scarcity of neo-Nazi support in the Republic of Croatia, its potential for threatening the security status is minimal.

In regard to left-wing extremism, domestic anarchist groups are in contact with foreign anarchist individuals and groups, and anarchist groups in the region that have been registered for their radical activities. Thus far, the activism of these individuals has been non-violent and consists mostly of participation at anarchist gatherings and communication with sympathizers

The consequences of war trauma and unresolved inter-ethnic relations that may become fertile soil for the strengthening of extremism can also have an impact on the state of security.

Organizations and followers of the Chetnik movement are still active in the neighbouring states. In addition, sympathizers are also in contact with like-minded individuals in Croatia and other organizations and individuals advocating Greater Serbian ideology. The fact that more and more members of the younger population in Croatia are observed to express sympathy towards Greater Serbian and Chetnik extremism gives rise to concern. Sympathizers of the Chetnik movement also promote extremely anti-NATO viewpoints.

Just like in previous years, some Croatian nationals have joined the conflict in Ukraine as members of Ukrainian units. Up to the beginning of 2016, 19 Croatian nationals have travelled to Ukraine with the intent to join the fighting. In early 2016 five of them were still in Ukraine.

Foreign Intelligence Activities in the Republic of Croatia

The internal political situation in the Republic of Croatia, as well as its foreign policy, are a point of intelligence interest for states whose interests, activities, and views are not in harmony with those of Croatia.

In recent years, the Republic of Croatia, due to its NATO and EU membership, and geo-political position, has been exposed to intelligence activities of states which perceive the EU and NATO as security threats or challenges. Through their intelligence activities in the Republic of Croatia, these states strive to collect information on processes that are evolving in the EU and NATO. The intelligence officers from these states, as a rule, take on the role of diplomats in embassies, or use other means to disguise their true identity and intentions.

Foreign intelligence agencies focus upon the collection of political, economic, technological information, and information on the participation of the Republic of Croatia in NATO and EU bodies, as well as the positions of the Republic of Croatia in regional and global processes. Particular attention is devoted to the collection of information on dissonant views within the EU and NATO regarding crises and energy projects.

In their work, these foreign services also use "active measures", by which they attempt to influence public opinion by abusing the Croatian media in furtherance of their interests. For instance, they attempt to influence public opinion in regard to NATO's and EU's roles in current crisis hotspots, presenting Croatian foreign policy and Croatian allies in negative terms.

Croatia is the object of intelligence activities of those states which perceive the EU and NATO as security threats or challenges.

In addition to the afore-mentioned activities, certain foreign services are engaged in economic and industrial espionage in the Republic of Croatia, and are interested in major economic projects as well as new and modern technologies. The topic of economic espionage offers new possibilities for SOA's activities, such as providing consulting support to Croatian businessmen who work with foreign entities or business activities abroad.

Migration wave

The great migration wave toward Europe that formed in the course of 2015 as a consequence of catastrophic political and security status of the conflict affected countries of the Middle East and North Africa but also of poor economic situation in large number of those in Africa and Asia presents a great challenge to the global, especially European security.

Up to September 2015, most of the refugees and migrants travelled to the EU through Hungary, without entering Croatia. In that period, the number of illegal migrants in Croatia was very small; in fact, in the first nine months of 2015, only about 1200 illegal migrants were registered.

When Hungary closed its borders to Serbia in September, the migrants were redirected to Croatia which from 16 September until the end of 2015 saw about 600 thousand migrants transit her territory.

Reception centers and organized transport of migrants that were subsequently established prevented their uncontrolled movement through the territory and greatly diminished the role that smuggling networks play in the illegal migrant transport.

Migrations do not present a security issue in themselves. However, certain aspects of migrations do have a security dimension. After terrorist attacks in Europe, the security risks related to the migration pressure become higher. The most significant risks stemming from uncontrolled migrations are internal instabilities resulting from lack of migrants' integration into the society, spread of xenophobic movements, more prominent extremism and weakened cohesion within the EU. There are other risks, like the one emanating from the rise of organised crime in countries that have accepted large number of migrants and the radicalisation of some migrants by local Islamist activists.

Possible build-up of migrants in the Southeastern European countries could, along with humanitarian issues, cause problems in security as well as reactivate smuggling routes.

Main migration routes to Europe

In 2015 about a million of migrants and refugees entered the EU via the Mediterranean. Of those, more than 800 thousand passed through Greece and continued along the so-called 'Balkan' route to reach Western Europe. Around 150 thousand travelled through Italy, along the Central Mediterranean route, while approximately 20 thousand followed the West Mediterranean one.

About 4.000 people drowned in 2015 while attempting to cross the sea to reach the EU countries.

Migration flows give rise to other security, demographic, socio-economic and health challenges. The trend of stronger migration pressure to the EU territory will continue in the forthcoming period due to a series of favorable factors such as enduring conflicts and political

instabilities, poverty and unemployment, climate changes, access to information and high profits made by human traffickers.

Corruption

Corruption in public administration, state institutions and bodies, and state-owned and public companies, is one of Croatia's greatest challenges. It threatens the functioning of the market, economic growth, decreases tax revenues, negatively affects the national budget, and creates insecurity and loss of confidence in state institutions. These factors diminish the investment potential in Croatia and impact the international reputation of the Republic of Croatia and its activities on the international market.

Corruption has an indirect negative effect on national security as well; thus SOA has taken on the role, in cooperation with other competent bodies, of providing a support mechanism in its prevention and eradication.

The most frequent forms of corruption in the Republic of Croatia are linked to public tenders, public procurement, negotiation of direct business deals, and the issuing of various types of permits and approvals. Attempts to influence political, judicial and other decision-making processes through corruption are especially worrying.

Due to the large sums involved, which underscore the importance of the public sector in the national economy, public procurement processes are particularly vulnerable to corruptive activities and attempts to illegally "pull out" money by non-transparent, fraudulent and illegal means, to the detriment of the national budget.

SOA'S CASEFILE:
CORRUPTION – PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF TARGET BIDDER

An authorized person, intending to acquire significant material benefits for themselves and others, misused their powers while to call for and carry out a public procurement tender for a state company by favoring certain private businesses whose owners illegally obtained profit to the detriment of the state company.

Said person enabled the owners of the private businesses to continue to make deals with the state company by giving them privileged information which they used to form the best offers for public tenders.

The same person also enabled adding annexes to contracts made with private businesses, using them as basis for setting prices higher than those initially agreed on and include other connected companies in the business deals, as well as breaking down more valuable deals so that smaller sums would enable them to make deals through direct agreement and to evade the obligation of calling out for a public tender.

They invested the money attained by those misappropriations into attractively located real-estate under the construction by the same connected businesses.

Organized Crime

The threat of organized crime is influenced considerably by Croatia's transport, economic, and geographic position. A branch of the so-called Balkan smuggling route used by the criminal groups to develop a strong cross-border cooperation is passing through the Croatian territory.

Several factors have an impact on organized crime trends, such as the difficult economic situation, poor security consolidation in some states of South-East Europe, and pressure on the Balkan route resulting from developments in numerous crisis hotspots in the Middle East and North Africa.

The use of Croatian territory as a haven for members of regional organized crime has continued, whether as a hiding place from rival criminal groups or for avoiding criminal prosecution in their domicile countries; that is, for planning future criminal activities. In such instances, they use the logistic assistance of individuals from the Croatian criminal milieu. This will continue to be a threat to the security status in the Republic of Croatia due to the danger that criminal altercations and conflicts outside the territories of their countries of origin will proliferate.

Prominent members of the criminal milieu from surrounding countries are also involved in financial investments in the Republic of Croatia, with the intent to conceal the sources of the illegally acquired funds.

The participation of individuals from the Republic of Croatia and the region in traditional cocaine smuggling routes from South America to Europe has also been confirmed, as well as their established status among South American criminal groups.

The unstable security situation in the areas of the Middle East and Africa, but Ukraine as well, creates increased demand for illegally procured arms and military equipment. This was identified by members of criminal groups from the Republic of Croatia and surrounding countries as a lucrative activity.

Energy Security

Energy security is not only an economic category. Energy sources are often used as a means for accomplishing foreign policy goals. Therefore, energy security is also an important political issue which is strongly intertwined with the protection of national interests. The Republic of Croatia has the geo-political preconditions for regional and European positioning and can capitalize on its geographic position by increasing energy security and by becoming a major energy hub.

Realization of the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP), supplied by the planned LNG terminal on the island of Krk in the North and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) in the South, would contribute to a significant improvement of energy security in the countries of the region.

Map of planned gas pipelines passing through Southeastern Europe

Cyber challenges

Threats stemming from cyber space are becoming ever more prominent. Increasing reliance on communication and information structures makes societies more vulnerable.

Numerous state and individual actors take advantage of the possibilities that cyber space offers in order to endanger security.

Hacker attacks motivated by various reasons, from winning fame for oneself to gathering information happen on a daily basis, while all the more numerous individuals and groups, who are motivated by ideological reasons, employ hacking methods for activist purposes (the so-called hactivists).

Finally, terrorists and extremists also use cyber space to spread their ideology and for training, recruitment and communication purposes.

Cyber-crime is on the rise as criminals are embracing it as yet another space where they can conduct their activities.

Since Croatia is an EU and NATO member, we may expect cyber threats to increase and become even more sophisticated. The experience of other EU and NATO members shows that cyber campaigns may be used for sabotage, destruction or as an additional form of information warfare within the framework of the so-called hybrid warfare.

Demographic challenges

Even through the connection between demographics and national security is not always straightforward and clear, the dynamic of certain demographic tendencies can have an impact on security-political processes, either independently or in synergy with other factors. This impact has prompted SOA to analyze the connection between demographic tendencies and national security.

Contemporary demographic indicators for Croatia point to the sharply negative demographic structure and trends whose continuation may have a long term harmful effect on the socio-economic development of Croatia. These demographic trends (very low birth rates, depopulation, negative migration balance, ageing population) could significantly increase the challenges faced by Croatian society.

Migration toward the EU will further affect demographic dynamics of Croatian and European societies. In 2014, the EU had a population of 19.6 million people who were not citizens of EU member states, while 33.5 million living in the EU were born elsewhere. Likewise, 14.3 million EU citizens do not live in the country they were born in.

War Crimes

SOA continuously works on the establishment of locations of individual and mass graves of missing persons from the Homeland War, collects information on war criminals, as well as on the place of residence of persons on the run from criminal prosecution for war crimes they have committed. The cooperation of SOA with citizens who have information on the missing persons and possible burial sites plays a key role.

Responding to contemporary
security challenges requires
intensive international security-
intelligence cooperation.

SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SURROUNDING REGION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

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Security challenges affecting the Republic of Croatia

Security Situation in the Neighbouring Southeast Region of the Republic of Croatia

Although insufficiently consolidated in a political, security, or economic sense, the neighbouring southeast region of Croatia does not represent a significant security threat. Nevertheless, there are many security challenges that have a spillover effect on Croatia.

Regardless of the challenges faced by the states in that region, their nature is not such that could cause serious armed conflicts. However, we do not rule out the possibility of outbreaks of unrest, incidents or political crises that could jeopardize Croatia's economic, political and security interests or interests of Croats residing in SEE countries.

Islamist extremism is continuously on the rise in SE Europe. The spread of radical interpretation of Islam is additionally fueled by difficult economic situation and the emergence

of religious "authorities" who find radical beliefs acceptable. Public calls of ISIS members for committing terrorist acts in SE Europe and beyond and the return of jihadists from war zones in Syria and Iraq pose a security threat.

An image from the video clip released on 10 July 2015 „We are the Islamic Caliphate – qasida" in which ISIS "announced" the spread of the so-called Islamic State to countries of SE Europe, including Croatia

In the long run, a part of SEE territory where jihadists return to may become a stronghold for international terrorist groups, which could serve them as a base for easier and more efficient positioning in Western Europe.

The neigbouring southeast region of Croatia is also struggling with difficult economic situation, undeveloped institutions and high level of corruption and political clientelism, while slow reforms hamper any further progress in Euro-Atlantic integration. These issues benefit the growing influence of factors that oppose the Euro-Atlantic integration.

The active presence of the international community provides a specific factor of stability. Although the Euro-Atlantic influence still dominates in that region, there is nonetheless room for the influence of other global and regional actors.

Economic and social conditions are still very unfavorable, which results in the dissatisfaction of the population, protests, migrations, deterioration of the financial situation, and an increased lagging behind as compared to the EU.

Under these circumstances, the neighbouring southeast countries are fertile ground for corruption, organized crime, illegal trade, spreading of national and religious radicalism, and extremism.

The migration wave came as an additional burden on the countries in the neighbouring Southeast region, as they lack the housing, organizational and financial capacities for a more permanent accommodation of a larger number of migrants. Possible creation of migrant hotspots would present great challenge to these countries, along with the potential re-activation of regional smuggling networks and corruption at borders. The migrant wave also fuels the risk of various illegal goods being smuggled via the same routes.

Regional security conditions are also marked by the continued public activity of existing Greater Serbian extremist organizations and the appearance of new ones, along with the presence of historic revisionism. Their activities are characterized by positions in opposition to NATO and the EU. The joining of Chetnik movement members to pro-Russian units in the Ukrainian conflict has also been registered.

The actions of police and legislative bodies in the neighbouring SE Europe states partially suppressed trafficking and broke up some criminal groups. This resulted in retributions within the criminal milieu; criminals from these SE European states also frequently attempt to find refuge in the Republic of Croatia, which increases the possibility of "settling of accounts" spilling over into the area of the Republic of Croatia.

Weapons from SE Europe that are smuggled to the EU mainly track their origin to the 1990s armed conflicts or weapons storages that are in some countries inadequately guarded.

The use of SE Europe as a transit area for trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and their components) also presents a security risk.

The threat of WMD proliferation is particularly marked in the context of using such weapons in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.

A Belt of Instability in the European Region

The European states are faced with a belt of instability that stretches from northern Africa, through the Middle East, to the Russian-Ukrainian border. This belt is the source of numerous security challenges, such as the spread of terrorism and "Jihadist" movements, migrations, extremism, organized crime, illegal migration and open regional armed conflicts.

Security state within the belt is mostly marked by destabilizing effects of Syrian-Iraqi, Libyan and Ukrainian crises, unprecedented migration and frequent terrorist attacks mounted by radical Islamists connected to ISIS, as well as a significant number of jihadist returnees, veterans of the Syrian-Iraqi conflict who return to their countries of origin.

The situation in current crisis focal points in the area of North Africa and the Middle East in unlikely to be improved soon; they will continue to be the source of numerous security challenges, threats and risks.

The great migration wave that hit Europe as a consequence of catastrophic political and security status of the conflict affected countries of the Middle East and North Africa but also of poor economic situation in large number of those in Africa and Asia presents a great challenge to the global, especially European security, even more so after it had been confirmed that ISIS members used migration routes to infiltrate the European territory.

In the context of the migration phenomenon, the cooperation established between criminal and terrorist groups was identified, increasing the security risk for European countries.

Map of conflict areas in Syria in the first half of 2016

The situation in Syria and Iraq is still very difficult as fights continue on a daily basis, with no indication of a resolution in the near future. These crisis focal points became bases of terrorist

groups like ISIS and Al Nusra. Numerous terrorist attacks were mounted in neighbouring countries, such as Turkey and Lebanon during 2015, as a result of the crisis spillover.

Apart from operations in Syria and Iraq mounted by the antiterrorist coalition led by USA, Russian military has also carried out a powerful intervention into the Syrian crisis which led to additional complications of the Middle Eastern situation. Growing tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia leads to a further deepening of the Sunni-Shi'ite antagonism that, if escalates, could have great consequences on the entire region and further outside. Developments in Syria and Iraq has a significant effect on Turkey's interests as well.

Yemen is still immersed in the chaos of the raging civil war which serves as the arena for the regional power struggles as well as the Sunni-Shi'ite conflict. Saudi Arabia leads the Arab countries coalition whose military forces intervened in the conflict. Al Qaida and ISIS use the chaos of war in Yemen to strengthen their positions in the Arabian Peninsula.

Crisis focal points, along with the main regional players' rivalry and terrorist groups' activities threaten to cause further conflict spillover into other countries in the region, jeopardize the stability and territorial sovereignty of multiethnic countries and increase the threat of terrorism.

ISIS has taken over the role of the global jihadist movement leader from Al Qaida, continuing its successful trend of attracting a large number of foreign fighters and acknowledging terrorist groups' loyalty pledges, proclaiming them as its branches or provinces. The most active of those branches are located in Sinai (Egypt) and Libya.

Despite the rise to power of ISIS and the loss of a number of its commanders, Al Qaida continues to present a significant terrorist threat and make its presence felt in different parts of the world. For example, Jabhat al Nusra (known as Al Nusra Front) with armed battalions in Syria and Somalian Al Shabab, responsible for many terrorist attacks carried out in East Africa, are also among its branches.

Areas under Al Qaida's influence

Terrorist attacks in Tunisia, France and Belgium as well as the downing of the Russian passenger plane in Egypt demonstrate that ISIS has the ability to carry out complex and coordinated attacks with a great number of civilian victims. Masses of European jihadists returning from the Syrian/Iraqi warfront to their home countries and younger people, the target group of aggressive Islamist propaganda, present a security risk for Croatia as well.

Libya which faces conflicts between various militias but whose central government has no control over its territory is becoming the new stronghold of ISIS. The number of its members in that country is growing, especially with those arriving from North Africa. The fact that ISIS is growing in power in Libya presents a threat to the neighbouring countries as well, due to their inability to control their borders with Libya stretching far across the desert.

Presence of ISIS in Libya in the first half of 2016

The area from Mali and Nigeria through Libya to Somalia is characterized by instability, activities of radical Islamic groups, poor economic circumstances, and population migrations. It is this continuous geographical space that enabled the formation of weapons transport routes and physical lines of communication between jihadist groups.

Numerous terrorist attacks carried out during 2015 in North African countries, such as Tunisia and Egypt, have grave effects on the local economies, especially the tourism sector. This will be an additional hindrance to their economic development which creates prerequisites for the spread of poverty and disgruntlement which in turn lead to greater migration pressure towards Europe as well as the spread of extremism.

Terrorist organizations increase their activities in Central Asian countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as in the Caucasus region.

Individual terrorist attacks mounted by the so-called 'lone wolves' inspired by the ISIS propaganda at times happen even on places farthest away from the crisis hot spots, such as USA, Canada and Australia.

The use of Internet and social networks for terrorist purposes is a growing trend. ISIS manages to use modern communication and propaganda tools to attract new members and send out call for attacks to its members and sympathizers more effectively and more often than any other terrorist organization before.

For years Russia has been opposed to NATO and EU's expansion towards Eastern Europe and strives to keep its area of influence as far away from its borders as possible.

In these circumstances NATO members focus more on the guarantee of collective defense provided by the Alliance.

The Ukrainian crisis, which led to the most serious tension between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War, has not been resolved yet because the conflicted sides, despite the mechanism for a peaceful conflict resolution and the preservation of a fragile ceasefire (the Minsk Protocol, OESS), are not close to reaching a permanent agreement on political resolution of the conflict. The Russian-Ukrainian relations continued to deteriorate which manifested itself in imposing mutual sanctions with Crimea's political, economic and energy ties with Russia growing ever stronger. The fact that the Ukrainian military and pro-Russian rebels are neck-to-neck when it comes to military power and the presence of a demarcation line as of February 2015 demonstrate a certain "freezing" of conflicts.

There are other frozen conflicts in the countries surrounding Russia, such as those in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Their status is still unresolved but that can potentially grow into crisis hotspots or open conflicts.

Deteriorating relations between Russia and the West have had a powerful effect on the global energy security. Western sanctions along with the fall in oil prices and natural gas contributed to the wane in the Russian economy. Decreased oil prices also affected budgets of many other countries that export oil which means that further political instabilities can be expected if the prices do not increase.

Last year was marked by further diminishing of the effect Ukraine has had as a transit route for Russian gas, even though the Turkish stream pipeline project has been frozen after Turkey downed the Russian military plane in November 2015.

Russian-Turkish relations have seriously soured following the Russian intervention in Syria on the side of Assad's regime and the freezing of Turkish stream is a consequence of that.

Abolition of sanctions against Iran, as part of the newly made agreement on the country's nuclear program, brings forth new political and economic dynamics in international relations with global effects.

SOA analyses provide the state leadership with a basis for informed decision-making in protecting Croatia's national security and interests.

SOA's ACTIVITIES IN NUMBERS

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Analytical Reports

Security-intelligence analyses and information are SOA's main "products". By its analytical information, SOA continually informs the state leadership on relevant topics that may impact national security. In this way, SOA supports the state leadership in the bringing of decisions essential for national security and interests.

In the course of 2015 SOA has submitted approximately 10500 security-intelligence reports to its users.

In the course of 2015, SOA has submitted to the state leadership (President and Government of the Republic of Croatia) about 300 various analytical reports.

In addition to state leadership, SOA also informs other bodies, such as the Croatian Parliament, Office of the National Security Council, State Attorney's Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other ministries of the data it has collected, thereby supporting the work of other bodies in the protection of national security. In the course of 2015, SOA submitted approximately 10500 security-intelligence reports to its users.

Approximate annual number of security-intelligence reports transmitted to users

International exchange of information is a prerequisite for responding successfully to increasingly complex transnational challenges. SOA cooperates on a daily basis and exchanges security-intelligence information on common challenges with its international partners: partner security-intelligence services and corresponding bodies within the EU, NATO, and multilateral forums of which SOA is member.

International exchange of information increased considerably after Croatia joined the Euro-Atlantic integrations and multilateral security-intelligence fora related to the same. Since 2013, the amount of information that SOA submits to relevant EU bodies has tripled.

Index chart of outgoing information that SOA transmitted to EU bodies (2013 = 100)

In addition to collecting information of significance to national security, SOA carries out other activities as well, directed at strengthening the security framework of the Republic of Croatia: security vetting, counter-intelligence protection, and security of protected persons.

Security Vetting

A security vetting is a procedure that identifies security concerns for physical and legal persons. The procedure is performed by the authorized security-intelligence agency. SOA carries out all the security vetting in respect to civilians.

In 2015, SOA carried out 5670 security vetting procedures.

Security vetting enhances the security of organizations; namely, prevents individuals with security impediments from coming into contact with sensitive data or performing duties where they can threaten the security or interests of the Republic of Croatia.

Security vetting is structured according to NATO and EU standards. Because the security vetting procedure includes access to personal data, a transparent procedure has been established which is regulated by the Security Vetting Act.

In 2015, a total of 5670 reports have been submitted on conducted security vetting.

Number of conducted security vetting procedures in the period from 2012 to 2015

Of the security vetting procedures conducted in 2015, 5010 of them were carried out in regard to access to classified information of various levels of confidentiality, at the request of UVNS and VSOA. In addition to vetting for access to classified information, 660 basic security vetting procedures were carried out at the request of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, the Croatian Parliament, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Supreme Court, Ministry of Internal Affairs, VSOA, State Attorney's Office, Customs Office of the Ministry of Finance, and other competent bodies, as well as for SOA's needs.

Based on information gathered via security vetting, SOA issued negative opinions in regards to 111 persons.

In 2015, 29 security vetting procedures were conducted for legal entities for the purpose of obtaining a business security certificate at the request of UVNS.

"We would like to encourage young, educated, and motivated individuals who welcome challenge and wish to contribute to the general well-being of our country to apply for employment in SOA."

MANAGEMENT OF SOA

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Organization and Structure

SOA's work is managed and guided from the headquarters in Zagreb, while its operative activities are conducted primarily through 10 regional centers.

The Director is at the head of SOA, and is appointed jointly by the President and Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia.

Work at the headquarters of SOA is carried out in the organization units responsible for:

- Collecting information (Operations)

- Processing and analyzing information and documentation (Analysis)

- Special technology, IT, and communications (Technical Operations)

- Counterintelligence protection and control (Internal Security and Control) and

- Human resources, legal and administrative-financial affairs.

SOA Organization Scheme

Budget Transparency

SOA's budget in 2015 amounted to around 324 million HRK, which is approximately 40 million HRK less than in 2011.

The approved budget for 2016 was around 315 million HRK, while for 2017 the planned budget is 320 million HRK. The stable level of financing enables more long-term and reliable work planning and capability development.


SOA budgetary trends from 2011 to 2015, in millions of HRK

Data on the material and financial operations of SOA are confidential. The sensitivity of security-intelligence activity requires protection in all fields of work. The budget is a segment of these overall activities and is also in need of protection, since the detailed structure of the budget can reveal the type of equipment being procured, who the suppliers are, which technological fields SOA is developing, etc., thus making its work more difficult. For example, knowledge about the procurement of new technological surveillance equipment can encourage criminal or terrorist groups to undertake measures to protect themselves from these systems.

The largest share of SOA's budget is allocated for personnel expenses and current expenditures required for the daily functioning of the Agency.

In four years (2012-2015) SOA has tripled its investments in development and modernization.

In order to further develop SOA's capabilities, special attention is devoted to the allocation of funds for development and modernization. This amount, in conformity with SOA's Development Plan, has grown in the last few years, and tripled as compared to 2012.

Growth index of investments in development and modernization
(Budget execution, 2012 = 100)

Increase of expenditures for development and modernization from 2012 to 2015 (budget execution)

In order to provide the required funds for development and modernization, SOA has in the last few years rationalized expenditures. Since 2012, SOA has reduced employee expenditures by 10%.

Index of expenditure reductions for employees
(Budget execution, 2012 = 100)

Expenditure reductions for employees from 2012 to 2015 (budget execution)

Management of Human Resources

The quality of SOA's work primarily depends on capabilities, knowledge and skills of its employees. Technological advancements and reliance on modern technologies have not reduced the importance of human factor in the success of security-intelligence activities.

SOA's scope of work requires employees of different professional specialties and profiles to fill the posts of analysts, operatives, and experts for human resources, legal and financial affairs, and support staff (security staff, administrative secretaries, etc.).

Women make up 40% of SOA work force and are engaged in all lines of work.

Due to the specific nature of the work they perform, but also the risks and threats to which they are exposed, SOA is obligated to protect the identity of its employees.

IVANA – PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE UNIT

My name is Ivana and I work as an operative in SOA's physical surveillance unit. My job consists of monitoring persons of SOA's interest, without this person knowing/noticing that he/she is being observed.

Patience and perseverance are prerequisites for conducting successful physical surveillance. It is a unique, exciting and unpredictable job which requires the ability to blend in perfectly with your environment. You have to be prepared for long hours of waiting and then sudden jumps into action. Being able to remain calm, focused and professional is essential to our tasks.

More often than not, this job has no fixed working hours and our tasks usually require personal flexibility.

Since the operations we conduct can be very complex and lengthy, team work is crucial for success.

What motivates me is the fact that by performing this challenging job I contribute to preserving the safety of our society.

Number and Structure of SOA's Employees

The precise number of SOA employees is classified. However, the overall number of SOA employees is similar to the number in other comparable services in developed European countries.

In recent years and in line with the Development Plan, SOA has been reducing the number of employees in order to provide funds for its ambitious projects of technological development and modernization, and for education, but without affecting the quality of operative and analytical work. When employing new people, SOA follows the principle of employing one new person for every two that leave SOA.

New employees are recruited on the basis of SOA needs for specific vacancies, and in line with employment plans and priorities for a specific year.

Women make up 40% of SOA work force. They have the same rights, opportunities, and responsibilities as their male colleagues.

Women account for 23% of the managerial positions in SOA, while 35% have senior or leading functions. In addition, the percentage of women in top positions has been increasing throughout the years, and SOA will continue to promote the role of women in the security-intelligence sector.

Admission Procedure

CVs of persons interested in finding employment at SOA are received throughout the whole year. They are usually sent by e-mail to the address zaposlenje@soa.hr. In addition, SOA cooperates with the Croatian Employment Office in finding candidates who correspond to its needs. SOA cooperates with Croatian academic and educational institutions as well.

Persons interested in finding employment in SOA can send their applications and CVs to the e-mail address zaposlenje@soa.hr

In accordance with the Employment Plan, the filling of each new vacancy requires the application of a stipulated procedure and corresponding criteria. In line with this, those candidates whose qualifications and test results correspond most with the requested profile will be selected.

9	Selected for admission and employment
23 candidates	Short-listed candidates
96 candidates	Selection testing
266 candidates	Pre-selection testing
416 candidates	Fulfilled requirements for free work posts. Beginning of admission procedures.

Overview of admission procedures by phases with number of candidates in each phase for the selection of 9 candidates

Education and Training

In accordance with the Development Plan, SOA exerted considerable effort in implementing the education and training programs for its employees. Accordingly, 40% more employees participated in various education programs in 2015 than in 2014.

In the process, particular emphasis was placed on the specialized education of SOA employees. The education programs are implemented within SOA, as well as in cooperation with other educational and academic institutions and state administration bodies. In the education of its employees, SOA also uses programs that are implemented abroad.

40% more employees were enrolled in various educational programs in 2015 than in 2014.

SOA also organizes training courses for employees of other institutions within its scope of activity.

SOA is under constant threefold external oversight: parliamentary oversight is carried out by the Croatian Parliament, expert oversight by the Office of the National Security Council, and civilian oversight by the Council for Civilian Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies.

OVERSIGHT OF SOA ACTIVITIES

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External Oversight

SOA is under constant threefold external oversight: parliamentary oversight conducted by the Croatian Parliament through the Committee for Internal Policy and National Security, expert oversight carried out by the Office of the National Security Council, and civilian oversight carried out by the Council for the Civilian Oversight of Security-Intelligence Agencies.

In the course of 2015, external institutions conducted a total of 17 oversights of SOA activities.

In the course of 2015, the Office of the National Security Council conducted a total of 12 oversights, while the Council for the Civilian Oversight of Security-Intelligence Agencies conducted five oversights.


Illustration of the external oversight of the legality of SOA activities

Internal Oversight

Along with external oversight, the internal oversight of the constitutionality and legality of work of SOA units and employees is implemented, as well as the oversight of information confidentiality protection and counterintelligence protection of SOA in general. Within the framework of these security-intelligence procedures, regular oversight was conducted and specific cases investigated when doubt arose regarding possible suspect behavior of SOA employees in terms of legality or violation of regulations.

In 2015, a total of 25 applications from oversight bodies and state institutions, that is, from citizens, were received for access to security-intelligence documentation linked to actual or presumed activities of SOA.

Six disciplinary procedures were initiated in 2015, due to violations of official duties, in line with the Act on the Security-Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia and the State Employees Act.

Six disciplinary procedures were initiated in 2015 for violations of official duties.

Illustration of multiple oversights of SOA activities

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

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Public Reports

Public relations present a challenge for SOA due to the need to keep the activities and operations of the Agency confidential and, at the same time, satisfy the public's need for authentic information on security challenges and on the work of the system they finance.

One of the ways in which we familiarize the public with our work are the public reports that contain unclassified information about SOA's work and the security situation in Croatia and the surrounding region.

On 14 June 2015 SOA released the second Public Report, which attracted large public interest. Comments on the Report were mainly favorable, while the general and expert public welcomed the release.

It was similar to reports of the services of developed democratic states, which they release regularly (Germany, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark, etc.).

Public reports were also very well received in international circles. Thus for instance, the report of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) from June 2015 mentions SOA's Public Report as an example of good practice. Praise was also given to SOA's efforts to bring its work closer to the public through engagement with organizations of civil society, the media and students.

SOA also supports communications and activities with bodies outside the security-intelligence system. SOA organizes visits and lectures for students in cooperation with universities. In 2015, lectures were held for students of political sciences and forensics. Likewise, on December 15, 2015, a third round table was held, with the participation of civil society organizations dealing with issues of human security, human rights, and transparency.

Public documents on SOA

Handover of Former Yugoslav State Security Service Documents to the State Archives

On 24 September 2015 SOA has given the documents left over after the former State Security Service (SDS) of the then Socialist Republic of Croatia to the Croatian State Archives.

It concerns the archived documentation that the then SDS generated from 1937 to 30 May 1990 which was subsequently found by the newly formed Croatian security and intelligence services.

SOA devoted two years to systematically go through and categorize those materials. The scope of that effort is illustrated by the fact that 134 meters of documentation were finally given to the state archives.

SOA has given 134 meters of the former SDS documentation to the state archives.

The documentation covers various areas of the former service's activity: internal issues, emigration, foreign intelligence services, service's activities, analytical reports and assessments, significant information and other material.

Newspaper and online news portals headlines reporting on SOA's handover of archived material.

The handover was part of SOA's efforts to make this valuable archive material available to researches and members of the general public and create a better insight into that particular period of the Croatian history. The documentation will be made available in the Croatian States Archives after it has been sorted out by the archivists and it will be subject to the regulations on handling the archive material as well personal information protection acts.

Croatian security and intelligence services have already given the dossiers on individuals generated by the former SDS to the State Archives, as well as a larger part of documents dating from the WWII period that the SDS had stored in its archives.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

BH – Bosnia and Herzegovina
CTG – Counter Terorrism Group
EU – European Union
HRK – Croatian Kuna (national currency)
IAP – Ionian Adriatic Pipeline
ISIS – *Islamic State of Iraq and the al-Sham*
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SEE – South-East Europe
SOA – Security-Intelligence Agency
SDS – State Security Service
TAP – Trans-Adriatic Pipeline
UN SC – United Nations Security Council
USKOK – Office for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime
UVNS – Office of the National Security Council
VNS – National Security Council
VSOA – Military Security and Intelligence Agency
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

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